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INTEGRATING THE DESEGREGATION
VOCABULARY- BROWN RIDES
NORTH, MAYBE*
J. BRAXTON CRAVEN, JR. * *

It is currently popular to suppose that judges, like children,
should be seen and not heard; and, if read at all, let it be only in the
official reports. Conscious of this sentiment, I think I would not
have had the temerity to open my mouth in public en this topic
but for your request that I do so. What I say, whether too much or
unwisely put, is my responsibility. That I say anything at all is partly
yours. One word of circumspection-the opinions I am about to express are good for this day only, or at most, until Monday if that is an
opinion day in the Supreme Court. My opinions are continually
subject to revision by a majority of the members of the Supreme
Court, which is the only body that may speak with final authority
in the constitutional area. Finally, with Emerson, I do believe that
a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds. Thus I shall
feel entirely free when I vote in school cases next month and next
year to be utterly faithless to this speech. But actually that problem
will not arise, for votes turn on an application of general principles
to a particular set of facts, and tonight I shall be talking only about
the principles-to the extent I can tentatively perceive them.
I am not sure that I know what the question is in the school
cases, but we might as well start with "What is a unitary school
system?" I had thought until recently that a unitary school system
had not been defined, but we have it on the highest authority now,
from none other than Chief Justice Burger, that it has been. The
definition stated in his recent concurring opinion in Northcross v.
Board of Education' is that a unitary system is one" 'within which no
* This article is the text of a speech given by Judge Craven at the Law
Day Banquet for the West Virginia University College of Law on April 11,
1970.
**Judge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit; A.B.,
1939, Duke University; LL.B., 1942, Harvard University.
1397 U.S. 232 (1970).
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person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or
color.' "" I have some difficulty with the Northcross definition and
so, indeed, does the Chief Justice. He calls it "cryptic," which makes
me think of what Humpty-Dumpty said to Alice: "When I use a
word it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." 3
The foregoing definition of a unitary system--"one within
which no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because
of race or color"-has a pleasant ring to the ear and unquestionably
expresses a noble aspiration to which the majority of Americans,
black and white, can bear allegiance. But as the Chief Justice himself
recognizes, in the very same paragraph in his concurring opinion in
Northcross, it is not an easy definition to apply to a given fact
situation. It is sort of like defining a dog as a quadruped mammal.
That is perfectly true, but it does not help distinguish a dog from
a cat.
In Northcross the Chief Justice, although insisting that the Court
had defined a unitary system, frankly recognized that the Court has
not yet clearly distinguished the dogs from the cats-the Chief Justice
said these questions remain unanswered:
1. Whether, as a constitutional matter, any particular
racial balance must be achieved in the schools....
2.

to what extent school districts and zones may or must
be altered as a constitutional matter....

3. to what extent transportation may or must be provided
to achieve the ends sought by prior holdings of the
Court.4
It is not at all surprising that the Court has not quickly and
finally answered these questions. It should not distress, I think,
even the most ardent advocate of civil rights that sixteen years after
Brown v. Board of Education5 we still do not know how much and
to what extent the decision must be implemented. Interpretations
of the Constitution, like the Constitution itself, are intentionally,
I think, framed in the broadest terms. The Court is far too wise to
fall into the error of precision. Like Humpty-Dumpty, the Court
2 Id.

at 237, citing Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S.

19, 20 (1969).
GLAss, 124 (1875).
v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232, 237 (1970).

3 L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING

4 Northcross

5347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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sometimes means precisely what it means, neither more nor less,
and quite sensibly is willing to take the time to allow the inferior
courts to experiment with words, giving content and meaning to the
doctrine which has been expounded. The truth is that the Court is
wise enough to know that it does not know precisely what ought
to be done and must be required. Like the rest of us, the Court learns
from experience-the experience of the inferior federal courts. Trial
balloons constantly soar aloft from the United States District Courts.
Some are shot down in flames by the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals,6 while others are allowed to orbit indefinitely. My own
court thought a decade ago that "freedom of choice" might be the
complete and adequate answer to the duty of implementation, but
experience showed that it did not work effectively in all factual situations, and finally the Supreme Court itself dealt it a near mortal
blow in Green v. New Kent County.7 Incidentally, it may be significant that Mr. Justice Black's injunction given in the rural context
of New Kent--"without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but
just schools" 8 -was not repeated as the definition of a unitary system in the urban context of Northcross. Implementing new constitutional dogma is largely a matter, I suggest, of trial and errorwith the lower courts trying and the Supreme Court calling the errors.
The major difficulty with school cases arises out of the thought
necessity of making the Constitution speak affirmatively 9 rather than
with its traditional negative voice." Until recently the Constitution
has been more like the Ten Commandments than the Sermon on
6

Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955), for example, was
adhered to by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for many years, but is now
dead. See Walker v. School Bd., 413 F.2d 53, 54 n.2 (4th Cir. 1969).
7 391 U.S. 430 (1968).

8Id.at 442.
9 Desegregation of Public Schools: An Affirmative Duty to Eliminate
Racial Segregation Root and Branch, 20 SYRACUSE L. Rnv. 53 (1968). For
an analysis of affirmative constitutional duties under the fourteenth amendment, see Justice Goldberg concurring in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,

286 (1964).

10 The traditional view of the Constitution as a series of limitations upon
government was recently epitomized by Justice Black's recent dissent in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 272-273 (1970):
[B]arly settlers [in America] undertook to curb their governments
by confining their powers within written boundaries, which eventually
became written constitutions. They wrote their basic charters as

nearly as men's collective wisdom could do so as to proclaim to
their people and their officials an emphatic command that:

Thus

far and no farther shall you go; and -where we neither delegate
powers to you, nor prohibit your exercise of them, we the people
are left free."
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the Mount. Constitutional dogma has ordinarily been framed in terms
of "thou shalt not."
E.g., Thou shalt not deny trial by jury.
E.g., Thou shalt not unreasonably search and seize.
E.g., Thou shalt not use a confession or evidence illegally
obtained.
E.g., Thou shalt not deny counsel to those charged with
crime.
E.g., Thou shalt not inhibit freedom of speech and press.
E.g., Thou shalt not deny the right to vote.
E.g., Thou shalt not suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
E.g., Thou shalt not enact an ex post facto law.
E.g., Thou shalt not grant titles of nobility.
E.g., Thou shalt not burden interstate commerce.
E.g., Thou shalt not make any law respecting the establishment of religion.
E.g., Thou shalt not infringe upon the right of the people
to keep and bear arms.
E.g., Thou shalt not take private property for public use
without just compensation.
E.g., Thou shalt not inflict cruel and unusual punishment.
When constitutional dogma is refrained in the affirmative, all
sorts of practical problems arise. In Gideon v. Wainwright" the
Court decided it was no longer enough that the state might not
deny a person charged with crime the right to counsel, and instead
affirmatively put upon the state the duty to provide such counsel
for indigents. The courts are still engaged in working out the scope
and extent of the affirmative duty. Already it has progressed from
those charged with crime to those faced with parole revocation, to
juvenile delinquents, and my court will soon decide whether it should
be extended to protect juveniles at a "waiver hearing" where it is
decided whether or not they will be proceeded against as adults.
It has long been settled that the state may not deny a transcript
of a trial for use on appeal to one who can pay for it, but the affirmative duty to provide it to indigents has now been engrafted
upon the negative right that it not be denied. 2
" 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
12 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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The reason for the exclusionary rules of evidence, 3 the application of which sometimes causes absurd results, is an attempt to strike
a happy medium between affirmative and negative concepts of the
Constitution. To say the Constitution forbids unreasonable searches
and seizures gets one nowhere unless there is actually some assurance
that they will not occur. That is why some think it is worthwhile to
let the criminal go free because the constable blundered. A better solution, but one for which the country may not yet be prepared, might
be to abandon the negative exclusionary rules and fashion an affirmative remedy against the state for substantial damages for infringements of constitutional liberty.' 4
Judicial innovation in problem-solving is at least as old as John
Marshall. The affirmative conception of the Constitution is not new,
but the increasing intellectual honesty has become more visible in
recent years. Being honest is great but it should not obscure valid
theory that even now limits judicial power. Fundamentally it is still
true that courts exercise only a veto power in the constitutional domain. In school cases the positive duties arise out of the negative
command: thou shalt not practice invidious discrimination in the
public schools. The courts have never said that the states must provide public schools or even public school busses:"5 only that if they
do, it must be on a non-discriminatory basis.
Brown v. Board of Education6was argued to the Supreme Court
December 8-11, 1952, reargued December 7-9, 1953, and decided
May 17, 1954. It overruled Plessy v. Ferguson'" and held that segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprived the children of the minority group of equal educational op13E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Wong Sun v.

United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);

Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
14 See Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir. 1970). Although
this case did afford an affirmative remedy, the cause of action was against
individual policemen and not against the municipality of Chicago. The court
held that claims of indemnity are not consolidated with tort claims, unless
there is another contested issue such as the duty of indemnitor to defend.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1960) has also held that Congress did not
intend to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which gives the injured party a cause of action in a civil suit where there
has been a deprivation of rights.
A similar question is currently under consideration by a panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Jenkins v. Averett,
4th Cir. No. 13,627.
15 Sparrow v. Gill, 304 F. Supp. 86, 90 (M.D.N.C. 1969).
18347 U.S. 483 (1954). [hereinafter referred to as Brown 1].
17 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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portunity. The Court postponed for further argument the question
of whether an appropriate decree should provide that "'within the
limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children
should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice,"' or
whether the Court might "'permit an effective gradual adjustment
to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not
based on color distinction.' , 9

Brown v. Board of Education" decided May 31, 1955, reiterated "the fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public
education is unconstitutional. . .. , It held that "[a]U provisions
of federal, state or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle."22 The Court put upon school authorities the "primary responsibility" for making the transition to a
system of public education freed of racial discrimination. It put
upon the inferior courts the duty to consider whether the action of
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the
holding of Brown I, that racial discrimination in public education is
unconstitutional. Also placed upon the inferior courts was the duty
to consider the adequacy of any plans to effectuate a transition to a
racially non-discriminatory school system. The Court contemplated
difficulties with "the school transportation system. . . [and] revision
of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve
a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis ...

23

The first gloss of any consequence rubbed on Brown I and
11 was that of Chief Judge Parker of my court in Briggs v. Elliott.2
Not surprisingly in that era, Judge Parker took the traditional negative approach to the Constitution and wrote that "the Constitution
does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination." 25
18Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495-496 n.13 (a) (1954).
19 Id. at 496 n.13 (b).
20 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter referred to as Brown I1].
21 Id. at 298.
22
1d.
23 Id. at 300-01.
24 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
25 [I]t is important that we point out exactly what the Supreme
Court has decided and what it has not decided in this case. It has
not decided that the federal courts are to take over or regulatd the
public schools of the states. It has not decided that the states must
mix persons of different races in the schools or must require them
to attend schools or must deprive them of the right of choosing the
schools they attend. What it has decided, and all that it has decided,
is that a state may not deny to any person on account of race the
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With that rubric, freedom of choice was a foregone conclusion
and apparently a complete answer. Pretty soon people began talking about de facto and de jure segregation,2" and this distinction
was thought, and may still be thought in some high places, to justify
continued segregation in the North while requiring some integration in
the South to dismantle formerly dual school systems.27 The flaw in

the de jure-de facto dichotomy is that from the moment Brown I
was announced, all federal, state and local laws requiring or per-

mitting segregation were void and of no effect. On and after May
31, 1955, there plainly could be, it seems to me, no de jure racial
discrimination in any school system in the United States. What was
left, North and South, was segregation in the schools in fact.28 The
de jure concept was never of any importance except as a handle upon
which to hang state action and an affirmative duty to dismantle. If
one accepts an affirmative conception of the Constitution, the de
right to attend any school that it maintains. This, under the decision
of the Supreme Court, the state may not do directly or indirectly;
but if the schools which it maintains are open to children of all
races, no violation of the Constitution is involved even though the
children of different races voluntarily attend different schools, as
they attend different churches. Nothing in the Constitution or in the
decision of the Supreme Court takes away from the people freedom
to choose the schools they attend. The Constitution, in other words,
does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It
does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary
action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce
segregation. The Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon the
exercise of power by the state or state agencies, not a limitation upon
th freedom of individuals.
Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955). The three
judge court in Briggs ordered only freedom of choice:
[I]t is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the provision of the
Constitution and laws of the State of South Carolina requiring
segregation of the races in the public schools are null and void
because violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that the defendants be and they are
hereby restrained and enjoined from refusing on account of race to
admit to any school under their supervision any child qualified
to enter such school, from and after such time as they may have
made the necessary arrangements for admission of children to such

school on a non-discriminatory basis. .
26

.

. Id. at 778-779.

See generally Note, The Conundrum of De-Facto and De-Jure Segregation, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 305 (1968).
27See e.g., Deal v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1965);

Gilliam v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965); Downs v. Board of
Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964); Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp.

819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963). But cf., Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 471 (D.D.C. 1969); Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226
F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Barksdale v. School Comm'n, 237 F. Supp.
543 (D.
Mass. 1963).
28
See Note, De Facto Segregation - a Study in State Action, 57
NORTHwVsTERN UNrvEsrrY L. Rnv. 722 (1963); Note, De Facto Segregation - the Courts and Urban Education, 46 N.C. L. REv. 89 (1967).
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jure idea becomes worthless and distinctions, North and South, intolerable.
If separation by race in the public schools renders educational opportunities inherently unequal (the constitutional fact of Brown
I), it seems to me to be purely of historical interest and wholly
irrelevant how the practice originated, whether by law, custom or
ghetto economics. It is inescapable that an all-black school in Baltimore is just as unequal as an all-black school in Atlanta. Since
Brown I is not subject to reargument, and indeed has been generally
accepted by the majority of Americans, I think we can more profitably concern ourselves with what is reasonably practicable for a
school board to do to correct inequality of educational opportunityNorth and South-rather than having our attention diverted to how
a particular school system may have become that way. Moreover,
I think it is not necessary to disregard history in order to arrive at
the same conclusion. People are pretty much the same everywhere,
and race prejudice, now and in the past, has not been confined to the
southern part of the United States. If South Carolina had laws to enforce segregation and New York did not, it may have been simply because New York did not need them to accomplish the same result,
i.e., the Harlem ghetto may have acccounted for as many all-black
schools as existed in half of South Carolina.
I confess that I have no idea when it may be said that a particular dual school system has been dismantled. The proper question, it
seems to me, is not what must be done to dismantle, but what must
be done to afford equal protection in terms of equal educational opportunity for all children. If the question be framed that way, it
applies North and South. And, in one nation, I think it should.
Although we do not yet know all the answers, we do have some
that can be stated with a relative degree of certainty:
E.g., no school system may lawfully operate a dual school
bus system with a "white" bus and a "black" bus traveling
the same roads to pick up children of different colors.2 9
E.g., no school district may be deliberately gerrymandered
into zones to include and exclude whites and blacks for the
purpose of continuing segregation.'*
29

E.g., Kelley v. Altheimer Public School Dist., 378 F.2d 483 (8th Cir.
1967).3
6E.g., Monroe v. Board of Conm'rs, 380 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1967).
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E.g., no school having in it black pupils can segregate them
in one classroom or deny them equal access to all school
activities, including athletics.3 '
E.g., no qualified Negro applicant may be denied a teaching position because of race.32
E.g., so-called black schools may not be closed and the
black teacher complement dismissed without providing
black teachers fair and equal employment opportunity in
the other schools in the system.33
E.g., new schools must be located and constructed so as not
to perpetuate segregation. 4
What we do not know has been authoritatively stated by the
Chief Justice in Northcross. The unanswered questions are these:
(1) May and/or must a school board reassign pupils from their own
neighborhood schools to schools located at distant points for the
purpose of achieving integration? How far is to far? (2) May a
school board be required to provide bussing to distant schools for
those who want it for the purpose of getting an integrated education?
Is there any distinction between bussing of black students and bussing of white students? (3) To what extent, if at all, may a school
board gerrymader zones for the purpose of achieving integration?
To what extent may be it required to do so?
Constitutional rights are seldom implemented perfectly. Although an accused is entitled to a lawyer, he is not entitled to
have Clarence Darrow or John W. Davis or even the best lawyer at
the local bar.
Similarly, it seems to me, it is doubtful that there is any unconditional right to racial balancing in the schools, or put differently,
it may be that such right must be balanced against cost and inconvenience and educational purposes other than integration for its own
sake. While no one would seriously suggest, absent a non-invidious
reason, that a black school and a white school located back to
back may be continued as separate institutions, neither has it been
31 E.g., Felder v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 409 F.2d 1070 (4th Cir.
1969); United States v. Savannah Bd. of Educ., 405 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1967).
(5th
32 United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836
Cir. 1966).
33 Wall v. Stanley County Bd. of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967).
34
Wheeler v. Durham County Bd. of Educ., 346 F.2d 768 (4th Cir.

1965).
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urged yet, so far as I know, that a new bridge must be built over
Puget Sound or San Francisco Bay to permit pairing of black and
white schools.
The limits of practicability dictate, perhaps, that courts can
require the states "to remedy only the harmful [racial] imbalance
that is also unjustified"35 by rational considerations of time, space,
and money.
Although some I have heard seem interminable, even the worst
speeches eventually and mercifully come to an end. This one does
not. The end has not yet been written and only the Supreme Court
can do it. All I can do is to stop it on a plaintive note: nobody
knows the trouble I have had, (except you) and will continue to
have, figuring out whether a school system is unitary. But it is
worth it. Indeed, I cannot think of anything more worthwhile than
the efforts of all of us to understand and help implement the dream
that this be one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all,
and that is what constitutional law is all about.

35 Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HAv. L. Rav. 564, 613 (1965).
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